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An Introduction 
Susan M. Collins 
For  the developing countries,  the  1970s were  a  time of  growing external 
indebtedness but  strong real  growth.  Borrowing seemed to  be  part  of  a 
sensible strategy of  growth and development. In the 1980s, however, the role 
of foreign borrowing was much less innocuous. After 1982 the majority of 
heavily  indebted countries found themselves in  the midst  of  a debt crisis 
which  was  more  severe  and  more  persistent  than  most  observers  had 
predicted. Growth rates were stagnant and often negative. In  many  cases, 
per  capita  incomes in  1987 were  below  their  1980 levels.  Fixed  capital 
formation as a share of income declined precipitously, diminishing prospects 
for future growth. More troubling, the indicators of  debt burden rose in  a 
large  number  of  countries.  The  debt  crisis  remains  a  long  way  from 
resolution. 
At  the  same  time,  there  have  been  substantial  differences  in  the 
experiences of  the  heavily  indebted  countries.  Some countries announced 
debt moratoria  while others avoided a crisis and countinued to repay their 
debts on, or ahead of,  schedule. Some maintained relatively high  growth 
rates and  financial stability during the early and  mid-l980s,  while others 
wrestled with exploding inflation. 
These diverse experiences raise interesting and important questions about 
the roles of  foreign borrowing and macroeconomic policy for small, open 
economies in  an  uncertain  world  environment.  How  did  those  countries 
which navigated the series of external shocks more successfully differ from 
those which are still struggling to “adjust”?  Did they simply borrow more 
prudently?  How  are  the  differences  in  performance  attributable  to  the 
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severity  of  external  shocks  as  opposed  to  current  and  previous  policy 
actions? How did external debt interact with political, social, and economic 
structure? 
The NBER country studies (volumes 2 and 3) examine in detail the policy 
and performance of eight heavily indebted developing countries: Argentina, 
Bolivia, Brazil, Korea, Indonesia, Mexico, the Philippines, and Turkey. The 
countries  differ  in  many  ways.  Indonesia  and  Bolivia  are  low-income 
countries while the rest  are middle income. Mexico and Indonesia are oil 
exporters,  Bolivia  exports  natural  gas  and  some  oil,  while  the  other 
countries are oil  importers.  Korea,  Indonesia,  and  Turkey had  relatively 
strong  macroeconomic performance  in  the  early  to  mid- 1980s,  although 
foreign  borrowing  played  a  central role  in  their  development.  Brazil  did 
relatively  well  during  1982-84,  but  emerged as  a  “problem  debtor”  by 
1986. In Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, and Mexico, price instability interacted 
with external debt to exacerbate the difficulties of stabilization and structural 
adjustment. In  those  countries and  in  the  Philippines,  improved external 
balance came at the expense of  domestic investment and growth prospects. 
Thus, the allocation of domestic resources among investment, consumption, 
and net transfers abroad to service the debt remains a critical issue. 
Each study takes a broad perspective, examining the role of  debt within 
the context of  macroeconomic policy and performance. While there is no 
single  model  or  approach,  there  are  common  elements  throughout.  In 
particular, the focus is on the debtor country’s perspective. Also, each study 
contains extensive data tables in the text and appendices. Finally, the authors 
have attempted to integrate social and political factors into their analyses and 
to emphasize the importance of historical context. 
The most striking aspect of these country studies is the similarities in their 
conclusions. It  appears that  countries which  performed  well in  the  1980s 
differed from  the  other countries in  three  fundamental ways.  First,  they 
maintained stable and competitive real  exchange rates.  Second, they  were 
successful in having a disciplined fiscal policy, containing budget deficits and 
maintaining  a  broad  tax  base.  Third,  they  emphasized  investment  with 
incentives for capital accumulation in export sectors. While microeconomic 
policies, the trade regime, and the severity of  external shocks all played a 
role (especially in the Philippines), these three macroeconomic policies stand 
out in explaining the range of performances. 
The  next  section provides a  brief  overview of  the  experience of  each 
country. The third section turns to a cross-country comparison of  the role of 
foreign borrowing and macroeconomic policy in the diverse performances. 
External Debt and Macroeconomic Performance 
Three  of  the  countries,  Indonesia,  Korea,  and  Turkey,  maintained 
moderate  to  high  real  growth  in  the  early  to  mid-l980s,  with  foreign 
borrowing playing a central role in each experience. In Indonesia, balance of 3  Introduction 
payments difficulties erupted in  1966. They resulted in a debt rescheduling 
and a coordinated, long-term plan of  official assistance. Turkey’s external 
crisis came in  1977, after the first oil price shock but well before repayment 
difficulties emerged in the other heavily indebted countries. Finally, Korea’s 
economic crisis began in late 1979 as a result of external shocks and internal 
political  and  economic  factors.  The  crisis  was  relatively  short,  as 
performance had  improved  considerably by  1981. While  Korea  did  not 
reschedule its debts, it did undertake a substantial shift in economic policies. 
The Philippines presents a stark contrast. Economic performance deterio- 
rated sharply during the 1980s, and the economy remains far from a path of 
stable growth. In many respects,  the Philippine experience was  similar to 
Mexico’s. Both borrowed to  finance capital flight and public  investments 
which did  not pay  off  in  long-term  growth or foreign exchange earnings. 
However, Mexico exports oil while the Philippines is an oil importer. 
In Argentina and Brazil the main economic problems revealed themselves 
in  the  form of  inflation rather  than  as pressure on the  external balance. 
However,  debt played  a central  role  both  in  fueling the  inflation  and  in 
compounding the difficulties of debt reduction. 
South Korea 
South Korea is widely heralded as an economic success story. In 1987 real 
growth was  12 percent, inflation was just  3 percent,  and the trade surplus 
had  risen  to  nearly  9  percent  of  GNP.  However,  as  Collins  and  Park 
emphasize, Korea was  not  always a high  growth surplus country. On the 
contrary, it faced a severe crisis in 1980. Real output declined by 5 percent, 
inflation rose to nearly 30 percent,  and the trade deficit mushroomed to 9 
percent of  GNP.  Korea  borrowed heavily to  finance these deficits and by 
1981 was the fourth largest debtor country in the world, behind Argentina, 
Brazil,  and  Mexico.  How  then  was  Korea  able  to  combine  external 
adjustment with real growth and price stability? 
A poor, war-devastated economy heavily dependent on foreign aid in the 
1950s, Korea  embarked  on  a  new  economic  strategy  of  active  export 
promotion and emerged as a newly industrialized country with growth rates 
averaging over 9 percent per year in the mid-1960s and 1970s. High rates of 
investment in exportables and competitive exchange rates, with credible and 
consistent  incentives  to  exporters,  are  the  key  factors  behind  Korea’s 
growth. Fiscal policy was used countercyclically, but budget deficits were 
not allowed to become large. Initially, domestic saving rates were very low, 
and high rates of  investment were financed by extensive foreign borrowing. 
A  remarkable  aspect  of  Korea’s  development  has  been  a  trend  rise  in 
aggregate domestic savings from less than 6 percent of  GNP in  the early 
1960s to over 30 percent by the mid-1980s. 
Korea’s  economic  strategy  shifted during  the  early  1970s. Concerned 
about industrial deepening and building up military strength, policymakers 
launched the Big Push to develop heavy and chemical industries in  1973. 4  Susan M. Collins 
Investment was to be increased  and concentrated in these sectors. However, 
the  period  coincided  with  the  first oil price  shock and slowdown  in  world 
growth.  Korea  decided  to pursue  the  Big  Push  nonetheless  and  borrowed 
heavily  to  finance  the  investments.  While  fiscal  policy  was  expanded  to 
stimulate growth, the exchange rate was devalued and then fixed, and heavy 
taxes were imposed on petroleum products.  World demand recovered during 
1976-78,  improving  Korean  export performance,  and  high  growth  rates 
resumed. Savings rose and the current account deficit was eliminated. 
However,  a growing number  of economic dislocations became  apparent. 
The  real  exchange  rate  began  to  appreciate,  export  growth  slowed,  the 
current account deteriorated,  and inflation surged. The government began to 
intervene more  heavily  in domestic  markets,  controlling  prices,  restricting 
imports, and rationing credit. As the other country studies make clear, this is 
the same pattern that emerged  in countries which ran  into difficulty.  Korea 
differs in that these distortions were addressed before they became extreme. 
Policymakers  became increasingly concerned  about inflation  and economic 
distortions.  A  new  stabilization  plan,  announced  in  1979,  called  for 
monetary  and fiscal restraint,  gradual reductions in price controls, and trade 
and  credit  market  liberalizations.  This  policy  shift  was  initiated  before 
domestic authorities were forced to adjust since the oil shock had not yet hit, 
and foreign lending was still available. 
Interestingly,  the  initial program  did not  call for devaluation  despite the 
fixed exchange rate and resulting appreciation. The exchange rate adjustment 
came in January  1980 in the midst of the crisis. Still, Korea’s overvaluation 
was corrected after the real exchange rate had appreciated by 25 percent.  In 
contrast,  Argentina  experienced  a  real  appreciation  of  over  80  percent 
between  1977 and  1980, before an adjustment was undertaken. 
Despite the severe shocks which hit Korea in  1979 and  1980, a full-scale 
debt  crisis  was  avoided.  However,  the  assassination  of  President  Park, 
disastrous agricultural harvests, the rise in oil and commodity prices, higher 
interest  rates,  and  the  slowdown  in  world  demand  all contributed  to very 
poor economic performance in  1980. 
Collins and Park point to four key elements which explain the impressive 
economic  turnaround  between  1980  and  1985.  First,  Korea  was  given 
breathing  space  by  foreign  creditors  for  the  stabilization  and  structural 
adjustment. The devaluation did not generate an immediate export recovery. 
But fiscal policy was expansionary in 1980-81  to stimulate growth. Imports 
were  contained,  not  through  recession  but  because  of  the  recovery  in 
agricultural  output which reduced food imports and boosted growth. Korea 
continued  to borrow  in  the  early  1980s to  finance  the  (shrinking)  current 
account deficits. The economy did not undertake a structural readjustment at 
the same time that austerity measures were used to improve external balance. 
Only in 1982, as output and export growth improved, did a fiscal contraction 
take place. 5  Introduction 
Second, Korean policy was stable and consistent. The real exchange rate 
varied  less than  in  most  developing countries.  Also,  budget  deficits were 
kept  relatively  small,  averaging 2.7  percent of  GNP during  1973-86  and 
ranging from 1.0 percent to 4.7 percent. 
Third, Korea persistently maintained high rates of  investment throughout 
the adjustment (29 to 33 percent of  GNP). These investments placed Korea 
in a prime position to take advantage of  the revival in world demand. 
The final element is the dramatic rise in  domestic savings. While Collins 
and Park  show that a large part of  the increase is associated with  Korea’s 
rapid growth, much of  Korean saving behavior remains unexplained. 
Turkey 
Turkey is unusual in that it experienced a debt crisis in  1977, before the 
second oil shock which caused most of  the other indebted countries to have 
repayment difficulties. At the time, it was the most severe debt crisis of the 
postwar period. Turkey rescheduled its debts and undertook a comprehensive 
stabilization and liberalization program. By  1982, as the debt crisis was just 
erupting in  most  countries,  Turkey had  reestablished creditworthiness.  In 
explaining the timing of events, Cellsun and Rodrik argue that it was not the 
1973 oil  shock and the policy response that  differentiate Turkey. Instead, 
their  analysis  highlights  the  role  of  convertible  Turkish  lira  deposits 
(CTLDs), a scheme for mobilizing short-term foreign loans. 
The Turkish episode had four phases. In 1963 Turkey launched the first in 
a  series  of  five-year  development plans.  The  plan  embodied  an  import 
substitution strategy with  emphasis on  domestic,  especially public  sector, 
savings. The  plans  were  successful in  achieving moderate growth  and  in 
containing inflation. However, trade restrictions and increasing overvaluation 
discouraged exports.  By  the end of  the  1960s, growth began  to  slow and 
attempts at reorientation, including devaluation and  some trade  liberaliza- 
tion, were not followed through. 
Turkey’s debt crisis erupted at the end of the second phase (1972-77).  It 
began with a surge in worker remittances from abroad in  1972-73,  which 
stimulated growth,  generated  a current account surplus,  and removed  the 
impetus  for  policy  refocus.  This  reluctance to  undertake  macroeconomic 
adjustments  distinguishes  Turkish  policy  from  policies  in  Korea  and 
Indonesia in the late 1970s. With its large foreign exchange inflows leading 
to a debt crisis largely through  macroeconomic mismanagement, Turkey’s 
experience parallels on a smaller scale what was to happen later in Mexico. 
Turkey embarked on an ambitious industrialization plan, concentrating on 
capital-intensive  industries.  As  in  Korea,  the  period  saw  rapid  debt 
accumulation, growing price distortions, budget deficits, and exchange rate 
appreciation.  Exports  stagnated,  and  the  current  account  deteriorated, 
especially during 1975-77  when  public spending surged, financed through 
domestic credit expansion, financed in turn by  foreign borrowing. Cellsun 6  Susan M. Collins 
and  Rodrik  argue  that  the  dynamics of  the  CTLDs,  which  encouraged 
short-term private loans from abroad by protecting domestic borrowers from 
exchange risk, allowed the surge in spending to take place. The loans were 
converted to domestic currency, expanding the domestic money supply and 
providing credit to the public sector. As overvaluation increased, the current 
account deteriorated, foreign exchange reserves  fell,  investors lost  confi- 
dence, and the scheme collapsed. 
During  1978-79,  Turkey rescheduled  some of  its  debt and  initiated  a 
series  of  stabilization  programs.  However,  fiscal  and  exchange  rate 
adjustments were too little, too late. The  external balance improved through 
import compression, but  investment  and  growth  declined  while  inflation 
accelerated.  This period  of  adjustment parallels the  experiences of  many 
other debtor countries. The case studies show no examples of programs that 
achieved stabilization  with  growth  when  the  trade balance improvement 
came from import compression. 
From 1980 to 1982, Turkey launched a comprehensive stabilization plan. 
The  initial  policies  were  orthodox,  export-oriented  shock  treatments, 
including devaluation and fiscal retrenchment. Real wages fell sharply, as 
did private spending, but Turkey managed to combine external adjustment 
with  real  growth.  The  key  was  surprisingly  strong  export  performance. 
While real  depreciation was  important, Cellsun  and  Rodrik  attribute the 
largest portion  to  “special  factors,”  including the  strong  demand  in  the 
Middle East associated with  the Iran-Iraq war and hefty export subsidies. 
They also stress the importance of debt relief, together with substantial new 
lending from the IMF, the World Bank,  and the OECD which reduced the 
need  for  import  compression.  These  external  factors  clearly  eased  the 
difficult early stages of Turkey’s adjustment. 
Indonesia 
Indonesia’s debt crisis occurred in  the mid-l960s, not during the  1970s 
and  1980s. Woo  and Nasution emphasize Indonesia’s earlier political and 
economic  crisis  in  explaining  why  macroeconomic  performance  was 
relatively  strong  in  the  1980s.  Prudent  macroeconomic  management, in 
particular  fiscal  and  exchange  rate  policies,  also  explain  why  foreign 
exchange inflows from oil revenues did not lead to a debt crisis as they did in 
Mexico and Turkey. 
When General Soeharto took office in October 1965 following a military 
coup, Indonesia was in the midst of civil war and economic turmoil. There 
were  growing  budget  deficits,  external  debt  and  inflation,  overvalued 
multiple exchange rates, stagnant economic growth, and a shrinking export 
sector. One of  the government’s first tasks was to stabilize the economy. A 
generous long-term plan of official assistance, including direct assistance and 
favorable terms for rescheduling existing debts, was coordinated by Western 
governments. This assistance enabled the government to raise investment, 7  Introduction 
take advantage of  a strong resource sector, and stimulate growth. In many 
respects, Indonesia’s growth strategy in  the late  1960s paralleled Korea’s 
strategy. The government adopted a pro-export orientation and a balanced 
budget  requirement. (Budget  deficits  could  not  be  financed by  domestic 
credit creation although they could be financed by foreign borrowing.) Woo 
and Nasution argue that the willingness to use active exchange rate policy to 
maintain competitiveness, along  with  incentives for  agriculture and  light 
manufacturing,  arose  from  the  desire to  retain  political  support  in  rural 
areas. In any case, 1966 to 1971 was a period of strong growth in output and 
exports. 
The next phase in Indonesia’s macroeconomic history came with the fixed 
exchange rate during 1971-78.  Strong export performance and then growing 
oil revenues led to a sizable current account surplus. By  1974 Indonesia had 
regained  access  to  international  financial markets.  However,  the  foreign 
exchange inflows did not trigger aggressive debt accumulation leading to a 
debt crisis as occurred in  Mexico  and  Turkey.  Although the  government 
increased  investments  and  other  expenditures and  did  not  cut  back  on 
external borrowing as oil revenues rose, debt declined as a share of exports 
and  of  GNP.  The  government’s  relatively  cautious  debt  strategy  was 
reinforced by the default of the state-owned oil company in 1975, which had 
borrowed extensively and was unable to roll over its large short-term debts. 
As  a result,  state-owned enterprises were denied direct access to interna- 
tional credit markets. 
In 1978 Indonesia devalued by 50 percent, marking the return to an active 
exchange rate management. The striking feature of this devaluation is that it 
was not triggered by a balance of payments crisis. Economic growth and the 
external  balance  were  strong.  Foreign  exchange reserves  were  abundant. 
However, the real exchange rate had  appreciated, hurting the competitive- 
ness of  nonoil exports. Nonoil exports responded strongly to the devalua- 
tion. As export receipts grew in  1979-81,  public investment was increased 
further. 
Indonesia did run  into some difficulties in  1982 and  1983 as oil prices 
slumped and world demand stagnated. Policymakers turned increasingly to 
quantitative  import  restrictions,  exacerbating microeconomic  distortions. 
Still,  macroeconomic  policies  were  the  key  to  explaining  Indonesia’s 
avoidance of  a  debt  crisis.  Strong export  performance  aided  by  active 
exchange rate  adjustment, prudent debt management with  relatively  little 
short-term borrowing, and the favorable terms of their existing debt from the 
earlier rescheduling were the main elements of Indonesia’s success. 
The Philippines 
Philippine macroeconomic performance  stands in  stark  contrast to  the 
performance in the three other non-Latin  American countries in the NBER 
group, and to expected performance in the late  1970s when the Philippines 8  Susan M. Collins 
was  often  grouped  with  the  Asian  tigers.  In  the  1980s,  the  Philippines 
became the only Asian country to declare a debt moratorium. Real growth, 
which  had  averaged 4.6 percent  during  1980-81,  averaged  -5.2  percent 
during  1984- 85. 
In some respects,  macroeconomic  policies  in  the Philippines  during the 
late  1970s  were  not  dramatically  different  from  policies  in  Korea  or 
Indonesia.  The real exchange rate appreciated at times during 1970-82,  but 
by at most  15 percent.  Korea’s real appreciation of the late  1970s was over 
25 percent.  Similarly,  the  Philippine  budget  deficit  rose  from 2 percent  of 
GNP in  1978 to 6 percent  in  1981. However, Korea’s budget  deficit rose 
from  1  percent  of  GNP in  1979 to  5  percent  in  1981.  Both  the  real 
appreciation and the budget deficits were small when compared to 80 percent 
real appreciations and  18 percent budget deficits in Argentina. 
Why  then  did  Philippine  macroeconomic performance deteriorate by  SO 
much? Dohner and  Intal  point  to two  factors. First, the magnitude  of  the 
external  shocks was  more  severe  for the  Philippines  than  for most  other 
developing countries.  Unlike Korea, for example, the Philippines suffered a 
secular  terms  of  trade  deterioration.  Some  structural  adjustments  were 
required  if  the  country  were  to  maintain  growth  rates  and  a  sustainable 
external  balance,  even  without  the  two  oil  price  shocks.  Second,  the 
political-economic  environment  under  President  Marcos  was  of  critical 
importance. Individual  favoritism  in  loan  allocation  and  misallocation  of 
other resources discouraged  private  investment,  particularly  in exportables, 
and encouraged capital flight. Government intervention became considerably 
more extensive  than  in  Korea or  Indonesia  during the  1970s, exacerbating 
the difficulties of an overvalued exchange rate and growing budget deficits. 
The Philippine experience had five phases. In the first, from 1966 to 1969, 
Marcos borrowed heavily  to finance a domestic expansion. The result  was 
growing  budget  and  current  account  deficits,  leading  to  a  balance  of 
payments crisis. The external debt was rescheduled in  1970. Like Soeharto, 
Marcos had early experience with the potential pitfalls of  foreign borrowing, 
but his caution lasted only until the late  1970s. 
The second period, from 1970 to  1972, included an economic stabilization 
plan  supported by the IMF. Devaluation, together with tight monetary  and 
fiscal policies, resulted in a sharp reduction in real wages and an increasingly 
violent  political  situation.  However,  strong export performance  helped  to 
revive economic growth. 
From 1972 to 1979, Philippine economic performance looked strong. Real 
growth  rose to 6.2 percent  per year,  nontraditional  exports increased, and 
investment  boomed.  However,  these  statistics  mask  underlying  economic 
difficulties which help to explain the reversal  after the second oil shock. In 
particular,  total  exports  failed  to  grow  as a  share of  GNP as traditional 
exports declined. Investments  undertaken produced  very  poor  returns and 9  Introduction 
labor  productivity  actually  declined.  Much  of  the  explanation  for  the 
system’s fragility comes from delayed exchange rate adjustments, disincen- 
tives for traditional export sectors, and the uncertainties and misallocations 
inherent  in  the  government’s growing  “crony  capitalism”  which  favored 
certain industries and individuals for political reasons. 
The situation deteriorated during 1979-82.  The Philippines was hit hard 
by  the second oil price shock. However, unlike Korea and Indonesia which 
had undertaken stabilization measures even before the shock, the Philippines 
reacted with expansionary policies to counteract the contractionary effects. 
External borrowing  soared to finance public investment projects,  some of 
which never materialized. Increasingly, borrowing was short term. The value 
of  exports  fell  sharply,  budget  and  current  account deficits continued  to 
grow, and capital flight exacerbated the balance of payments difficulties. In 
October 1983, when reserves were nearly depleted, the Philippines declared 
a  debt  moratorium.  During  1983-85,  harsh  austerity  measures  were 
undertaken.  Inflation  was  reduced  and  the  current  account  deficit  nearly 
eliminated, but the output costs of  stabilization were very large. Per capita 
income levels plunged to as low as those in the mid-l970s,  and investment 
fell by  more  than  half.  The  severe economic situation contributed to  the 
defeat of  Marcos in 1986. 
The new  government of  Corazon Aquino continues to struggle to revive 
growth. Many of the remaining problems are microeconomic. However, the 
case of  the Philippines also points to the difficulties in achieving sustained 
growth  in  an  economy  where  domestic  residents  have  grown  wary  of 
investing their resources at home and where investment has been slashed to 
improve the trade balance. In contrast,  Korea’s ability to reverse negative 
growth rates quickly is caused in large part by  its history of consistent and 
credible policies and by the persistently high rates of fixed capital formation, 
even in the midst of  the 1980 crisis. 
Mexico 
Mexico’s recent economic performance raises the question why a windfall 
in oil revenues should result in stagflation and a debt crisis. Buffie cites the 
“sustained bout of extraordinary fiscal indiscipline” as the major factor, and 
argues that the subsequent stabilization effort, which has contributed to the 
collapse of  investment, is ill conceived. Again, microeconomic distortions 
are part of the story, but the keys are poor exchange rate and fiscal policies. 
Buffie’s analysis contrasts Mexico’s post- 1972 performance with the high 
growth,  low  inflation  period  (1958-72).  In  the  earlier  period,  fiscal 
expansions were short lived and macro policy was managed with an eye to 
maintaining a stable exchange rate. Two cycles of expansion were followed 
by macroeconomic crises. The first was generated by  rapid fiscal expansion, 
financed  in  large  part  by  central  bank  credit.  Initially  the  expansion 10  Susan M. Collins 
stimulated growth,  but  then  inflation  accelerated,  the  real  exchange  rate 
appreciated,  the  current  account  worsened,  and  capital  flight  erupted, 
financed by rapid debt accumulation. The result was a balance of payments 
crisis in  1976. A large devaluation and an IMF program of  monetary and 
fiscal austerity followed, but the down side of the cycle appeared in 1977 as 
inflation surged while employment declined. 
Recognition of Mexico’s oil wealth, together with easily available external 
credits, was used to launch an even larger fiscal expansion in  1978-81.  As 
with the inflow from worker remittances in Turkey, the windfall was used to 
avoid, not to facilitate, a deeper structural adjustment. 
Again, the expansion generated strong growth in output and employment 
and high  investment, but  was  unsustainable. Buffie points to three major 
flaws  in  the  policy.  First,  public  sector  revenues,  net  of  transfers  of 
nonparastatals, declined despite the large oil  revenues. The tax  base  was 
small  and  shrinking.  Second,  despite the  dollar earnings  from petroleum 
exports, the current account deficit deteriorated. Trade liberalization along 
with  real  appreciation  generated  an  import  boom  and  stagnant  nonoil 
exports.  At  the  same time,  expected devaluation and  lack  of  confidence 
resulted  in  large  outflows of  private  capital.  External  debt  was  rapidly 
accumulated.  A  third  factor  in  the  program’s  unsustainability  was  the 
growing concentration in  short-term debt.  Unfortunately, the debt did not 
primarily  finance  investments  which  could  generate  foreign  exchange 
earnings and sustain growth. Much of the increase in public outlays went to 
current  expenditure,  while  many  of  the  investments  in  state-owned 
enterprises later proved unsound. 
As  Mexico became unable  to  service its  debts  in  1982 and  additional 
foreign loans dried up, the boom again turned to stagflation. Although the 
fiscal expansion continued and inflation soared, large real devaluations and 
trade restrictions cut imports, including intermediate inputs. Four years later, 
in  1986,  Mexico’s  real  output  was  below  its  level  at  the  beginning  of 
adjustment. 
In  1982-84  a severe austerity program was put  into place.  The current 
account  improved,  and  there  was  some  reduction  in  the  budget  deficit. 
However, inflation remained high, real GDP fell substantially, and private 
investment collapsed. The investment decline in  Mexico, as in  Argentina, 
was caused by  sharp reductions in available credit, together with high prices 
of  capital  goods  and  imported  intermediates.  There  was  no  progress  in 
reducing the budget deficit, as tax revenues remain stagnant and little effort 
was  made to broaden the tax  base.  The deficits were financed largely by 
government  bond  sales,  raising real  interest rates,  and  contracting credit 
available to the private sector. 
The collapse of  oil prices on the world market in  1986 brought renewed 
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trade deterioration compounded the difficulties of Mexico’s stabilization and 
structural adjustment. 
Argentina 
Dornbusch  and  de  Pablo  study  the  Argentine  debt  crisis  from  the 
perspective of  the country’s long history of  macroeconomic instability and 
political uncertainty coupled with the particular dynamics of  debt, deficits, 
and inflation. They conclude that policy and economic structure eventually 
would have led to a debt crisis; the external shocks of the 1970s and  1980s 
merely brought the crisis on  sooner. Again,  both fiscal and exchange rate 
policies were central. A massive overvaluation in the late  1970s created a 
large  external  debt.  Despite  aggressive  exchange  rate  management,  the 
difficulties were compounded in the 1980s as the budget deficit mushroomed 
out of control. 
The  late  1970s were  a  period  of  relative  macroeconomic stability  for 
Argentina. Finance Minister Martinez de Hoz had brought inflation down 
from  2,000 percent in  1975 to  100-200  percent  in  1976. Similarly, the 
budget deficit had been reduced from 15 to 7 percent of GDP. In an attempt 
to reduce inflation further, Argentina introduced a new exchange rate regime 
in 1979. The exchange rate depreciation was to be preannounced, and capital 
markets were opened fully in the hope that international competition would 
discipline domestic price setters. While inflation did fall, the cumulative real 
appreciation exceeded 50 percent by  the end of  1980. In anticipation of a 
maxidevaluation, there were massive capital outflows and accumulation of 
external debt. 
A series of  large devaluations between 1981 and  1982 restored the real 
exchange  rate  to  its  1976  level.  However,  the  Argentine  story  differs 
strikingly  from  that  of  Indonesia,  Korea,  and  Turkey,  where  large 
devaluations set the stage for rapid growth in exports and GNP, easing the 
burden of  external debt repayment.  Instead, Argentina’s economic perfor- 
mance  deteriorated  substantially  during  1981-83.  Despite  the  large 
exchange  rate  adjustments,  external  debt  accumulation  accelerated,  real 
growth turned negative, and inflation soared. 
There  are  three  main  reasons  why  the  devaluations  did  not  generate 
export-led growth as had  occurred in Turkey and Korea.  First,  Argentine 
exports  did  not  respond  quickly  to  the  real  depreciation  as  they  had  in 
Turkey because of  sluggish world demand and  a more fragmented export 
sector.  Second,  and  more  importantly,  Argentina  was  not  given  the 
“breathing  space”  of  continued  capital  inflows  in  the  first  years  of 
adjustment  which  had  eased  the  adjustments  in  Indonesia,  Korea,  and 
Turkey. Argentina was forced to reverse its current account quickly, from 
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improved  external  balance  was  achieved  by  cutting  imports  in  half  and 
through reduced investment and a domestic recession. 
Third,  Argentina’s  budget  deficit  more  than  doubled  during  1981 -83, 
while Korea, Turkey, and Indonesia all undertook fiscal corrections. Reasons 
for the increase included the government’s unwise exchange rate guarantees, 
which deteriorated the budget as additional devaluations were required,  and 
the military conflict in the Falklands. 
Dornbusch and de Pablo emphasize  the interaction between  the  inflation 
explosion and the government budget deficit, which averaged  18 percent of 
GDP  during  1981-83.  Rising  real  interest  rates  and  exchange  rate 
depreciation increased the government’s debt service obligations and thereby 
the budget deficit, leading to additional money creation and fueling inflation. 
The process  was  exacerbated  as institutional  changes provided  additional 
interest-bearing  substitutes for money. As Alfonsin took office in 1984, large 
wage increases put further pressure on the budget and inflation accelerated. 
By the end of  1984, Argentina seemed to be headed toward hyperinflation. 
The Austral  Plan,  a  heterodox  shock  treatment  launched  in  June  1985, 
succeeded in bringing inflation down to 100-200 percent. The plan included 
a wage and price freeze, a promise not to create money to finance the deficit, 
and  a rescheduling  agreement  with  creditors.  However,  the  budget  deficit 
remained at 5 percent of GNP, while net private investment turned negative. 
Fiscal  reform,  especially  broadening  the  tax  base,  remains  an  important 
issue on Argentina’s  agenda. 
Brazil 
Brazil’s experience combines elements from Korea,  Turkey, Mexico,  and 
Argentina.  Like Argentina,  Brazil has a long history of inflation, debt, and 
macroeconomic  crises  and  stabilization  plans.  Cardoso  and  Fishlow  argue 
that  external  debt  shifted  from  being  part  of  the  solution  to  attaining 
sustainable growth to being part of the problem. 
The  years  1968  to  1973  were  a  period  of  strong  growth.  Import 
substitution coupled  with  some export promotion  and  financed  by  foreign 
borrowing  seemed to be working  well.  When  the first oil price  shock hit, 
there  was  little political  support for an orthodox policy  response.  Instead, 
Brazil  elected  to  continue  the  expansion  and  embarked  on  a  National 
Development Plan which stimulated public  investment and stressed import 
substitution.  It  relied  on  external  funds  to  avoid  passing  external  price 
increases through to domestic consumers and to maintain domestic demand. 
Widespread  indexation  made the  rising  inflation  tolerable.  As the  current 
account  deteriorated,  the  government  relied  increasingly  on  direct  market 
intervention  and  controls  to restrict  imports. While  the  real  exchange  rate 
was  kept  relatively  constant,  few  incentives  were  created  to  encourage 
exports. Thus, when the second oil price shock hit,  the Brazilian economy 
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In  some respects, Brazil’s experience in  1974-78  paralleled the Korean 
experience.  Korea also decided to borrow  through the  oil  shock,  without 
altering its plans to invest in heavy and chemical industries. As  difficulties 
emerged, government intervention and import restrictions increased. How- 
ever, there were also some important differences. Korea passed through the 
external  price  changes.  Many  more  of  Korea’s  investments  were  in 
exportable industries, which  would later generate foreign exchange to help 
repay debts. Also, Korean domestic savings rose  during periods of  strong 
growth, helping to finance the investments. Finally, Korea began to reduce 
government direct intervention and the size of  subsidies to special interests 
before the crisis became serious. 
Brazil  attempted  to  implement  an  orthodox  program,  including  fiscal 
reform, in March 1979. However, the approach was labeled “recessionist.” 
A heterodox plan resembling the Argentine approach to inflation reduction 
through preannouncing the exchange rate devaluation was adopted instead, 
The program maintained real growth, inflation rose, the real exchange rate 
appreciated,  and  a  massive  current  account  deficit  led  to  rapid  debt 
accumulation. The plan was abandoned at the end of  1980 under pressure 
from foreign creditors.  Thus,  like Korea,  Brazil  suffered a debt crisis in 
1980. 
Restrictive macroeconomic policies in  198 1  resulted in a recession along 
with  a  trade  surplus,  restoring  Brazil’s  access  to  international  capital 
markets.  However,  Brazil’s  policy  lacked  attention  to  medium-term 
structural adjustment, and an opportunity was lost to put the economy back 
on  track. The public  deficit rose,  the real exchange rate  appreciated, and 
exports declined, forcing Brazil to go to the IMF and reschedule its debts. 
Under  a  series of  IMF  programs  during  1983-84,  Brazil  managed  to 
overfulfill  external  balance  targets  and  to  revive  growth  of  exports  and 
output, but inflation persisted. Cardoso and Fishlow believe that the policies 
pursued to generate trade surpluses to service the debt also fueled inflation. 
They  emphasize the  switch  from  external  debt  finance of  the  budget  to 
internal debt finance which pushed up  domestic interest rates,  feeding the 
budget  deficit  and  lowering  investment.  At  the  same  time,  agressive 
devaluation fueled inflation in the highly indexed economy. Brazil’s inertial 
inflation differs strikingly from inflation in Korea and the Philippines. 
At  the same time,  the  government was unable to raise tax  revenues,  a 
problem  shared by  Argentina,  Mexico,  and  the  Philippines.  Fiscal  policy 
played  a central role in  Brazil’s  transition from  a  “successful  debtor”  in 
1984 to a “problem debtor”  by  1986. 
Internal  problems, especially inflation, were  the dominant concern,  not 
external factors. Brazil also launched a heterodox plan to stop inflation in 
1986. The Cruzado Plan did stop inflation initially, but the gains were short 
lived. As November elections approached, fiscal policy became expansion- 
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capable of  containing the repressed inflation, the entire program fell apart 
and inflation reached 800 percent by mid-1987. Cardoso and Fishlow again 
emphasize  the  need  for  budget  corrections  and  for  revived  investment 
expenditures, if  Brazil is to achieve growth with financial stability. 
Common Themes 
There are many  similarities between countries which did relatively well 
and  those which are still struggling to resume growth with  low  inflation. 
Even Korea, Indonesia, and Turkey (the “high  growers”),  which  grew at 
moderate to high  rates and  avoided rescheduling in the  1980s, have been 
forced to readjust economic policies in the face of external shocks and poor 
economic performance. 
Strikingly,  external  shocks  were  not  the  primary  cause  of  economic 
difficulties in either the high growers or the debt reschedulers. Nor  do the 
differences in the magnitudes of  those shocks differentiate between the two 
groups. In all of the countries studied, problems emerged because domestic 
policies were ill suited to cope with external conditions. In Korea’s 1979-80 
crisis, external (and internal) shocks were compounded by  heavy imports, 
overvaluation, and increased fiscal deficits associated with the Big Push of 
the 1970s. In Turkey and Mexico, a foreign exchange windfall, not negative 
external  shocks,  set  the  stage  for  unsustainable  fiscal  expansion,  real 
appreciation, and debt accumulation. In contrast, foreign exchange inflows 
in  Indonesia  led  to  a  fiscal  expansion,  but  not  to  a  surge  in  foreign 
borrowing. 
Six Lessons 
There  are  six  important  differences  between  those  countries  which 
rescheduled in the 1980s and those which did not. First is the importance of 
the  breathing  space which  some countries had  at the initial stages of  the 
adjustment.  None  of  the  three  high  growers  undertook  a  structural 
adjustment at the same time that it converted its external deficit to a surplus. 
In  all three cases,  financing was  available to maintain  investments and  to 
stimulate growth while the current account deficit was reduced.  Indonesia 
received  generous  official  assistance  in  the  mid- 1960s. Turkey  received 
substantial foreign inflows after its  1977 crisis. Korea continued to borrow 
heavily in international capital markets during 1979-81.  These countries all 
ran into difficulties before the magnitude of  the crisis became evident and 
before lending to developing countries contracted in  1982. 
Second,  the  successful  countries  maintained  high  rates  of  capital 
formation. They avoided cuts in investment and encouraged investment in 
export industries. When world demand conditions were favorable, they were 
in  a prime position to expand their exports rapidly. Of  course, high rates of 
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are  severe  microeconomic  distortions.  The  Philippines  during  1979- 83 
provided a stark example of very high incremental capital output ratios when 
capital accumulation was concentrated in  industries with low  or  negative 
value added at world prices. 
Third,  the  successful countries  maintained  stable  and  competitive real 
exchange  rates.  Indonesia’s aggressive  exchange  rate  policy  kept  nonoil 
exports competitive. Korea maintained  a relatively stable and competitive 
real  exchange rate.  Devaluations in Brazil,  Indonesia,  Korea,  and Turkey 
were successful in expanding exports, although sometimes with a lag. 
Fourth, the importance of fiscal discipline and a strong tax base stands out 
from the country experiences. In Korea, budget deficits above 4 percent of 
GNP were considered very large and lasted for no more than two consecutive 
years  before  being  reduced  to  1-2  percent  of  GNP.  Revenues  were 
maintained and increased through the introduction of a value-added tax and 
other taxes. Korea’s public sector also contributed to a high saving rate. In 
contrast, Argentina has not had  a budget  deficit below  4 percent of  GNP 
since 1970. The deficit reached 18 percent of GNP during 1981-83.  In both 
Argentina  and  Brazil,  the  budget  deficit  played  a  central  role  in  debt 
accumulation and rising inflation. How to broaden and deepen the tax base 
has  plagued  these  two  countries  as  well  as  Bolivia,  Mexico,  and  the 
Philippines. 
The  timing  of  policy  response  to  external  shocks  is  a  fifth  important 
factor.  Indonesia and  Korea  initiated  adjustments because  of  undesirable 
domestic performance even before a crisis emerged. Arguably, Brazil could 
have  avoided much of  the  1981-83  recession if  it had  undertaken policy 
adjustments in  1979. 
Finally,  both  Korea  and  Indonesia  have  enjoyed  trend  increases  in 
domestic (especially private) savings. The rising saving rate enabled these 
countries  to  finance  high  rates  of  investment with  declining  reliance  on 
foreign borrowing. It is not clear, however, how much of the saving behavior 
is attributable to government policies and how much to social and political 
factors. 
Tradeoffs in Economic Policy 
A final theme which runs throughout the country case studies is how to 
allocate  domestic  resources  among  consumption  (public  and  private), 
investment, and net resource transfers abroad. In the years preceding a debt 
crisis,  the  typical  pattern  has  been  an  inflow  of  resources  from  abroad 
allocated  to  a  combination  of  higher  domestic  consumption  and  higher 
investment. In Korea, the resources went primarily to investment. In Mexico 
and the Philippines in the early 1980s, a large part of  the resources went to 
increased consumption. 
Difficult policy decisions arise when the net resource transfer must go in 
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matters  how  the  transfer  is  achieved.  Alternatives  include  inflation,  as in 
Argentina,  Bolivia,  Brazil,  and  perhaps  Turkey  in the  late  1970s, income 
taxes,  and  cuts  in  government  expenditures.  The  alternatives  can  have 
widely different distributional consequences.  However, for political as well 
as economic reasons,  there are limits to the amount consumption levels can 
be squeezed in already poor countries. 
This perspective highlights differences in the adjustments across countries. 
Initially, Korea and Indonesia were able to maintain investment because the 
net resource inflow continued.  Over time, real growth  stimulated domestic 
savings,  reducing  private  consumption  as a  share of  GNP.  The  “lower” 
consumption substituted for net inflows from abroad by freeing resources for 
investment. In Argentina,  Bolivia,  Brazil,  Mexico, and the Philippines,  the 
reversal  of  net  resource  inflows  led  to  cuts  in  investment  and  private 
consumption  to contain  imports.  Growth  slowed  and  there  was  no rise  in 
private savings to ease the transfer burden. Thus, there are strong arguments 
for reducing debt repayments  in order to stimulate investment and growth. 
The tradeoffs involved in allocation of domestic resources are at the heart of 
the  debates  over schemes  for debt  reduction.  The lesson  which  emerges 
strongly from the NBER country studies is that, while capital inflows are no 
panacea  and  need  not  lead  to investment  and  growth,  it  is  unrealistic  to 
expect countries  to revive  growth  without  some  “breathing  space”  while 
they initiate structural adjustments. 